A final heroic act by Zelenskyy, in 2025?
English original of article published today in Italian in La Stampa. Update in [..]
Henry Kissinger, the American statesman who died almost exactly a year ago, said of the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s that he wished both sides could lose. As 2024 comes to an end and everyone is preparing for Donald Trump’s return to the White House on January 20th, Kissinger’s saying looks horribly apt for the Russian war in Ukraine: both sides are losing.
The past 12 months of horrible, attritional conflict have left both sides exhausted and neither has gained a significant advantage. Russia’s forces have gained some territory in eastern Ukraine: according to the Institute for the Study of War, by early December Russian forces had seized 2,700 square kilometres of Ukraine this year, which is a big increase on the 465 square kilometres it seized in 2023 but represents a mere 0.4% of Ukraine’s total land area.
Russia has seized less than half a percent of Ukraine at an estimated cost of 350,000 casualties. The UK Ministry of Defence has stated that in November Russia was losing 1,500 soldiers every day, a far worse casualty rate than it was suffering in either 2022 or 2023. Media commentators have frequently predicted that in the face of this pressure Ukraine’s defences were about to collapse, but so far this has not happened.
Ukraine meanwhile mounted its own invasion of Russia in August when its troops crossed the Russian border into the Kursk region, seizing about 1,400 square kilometres of territory. This forced Russia to send an estimated 50,000 troops, including 12,000 North Korean mercenaries, to try to drive the Ukrainians out, which so far they have failed to do. Nonetheless, the area occupied by Ukraine has shrunk to about 800 square kilometres.
At the same time, the two sides have been attacking deep inside each other’s country. Russia has continued to concentrate its missile attacks on Ukraine’s power grid and its cities, while Ukraine has focused on attacking arms stores, oil refineries and the leadership of Russia’s forces. In recent weeks Ukrainian spies have penetrated Moscow to kill a leading missile designer and this week, in the biggest coup of all, the senior general in charge of its chemical, biological and radiological forces.
Neither Russia nor Ukraine has the upper hand. Both know that the early months of next year could bring political changes that might be to their advantage: President Putin may be looking forward to Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency, given that this makes it unlikely that the American Congress will authorise more weapons deliveries to Ukraine and likely that the US will withdraw authorisation for the use of American-supplied weapons for long-range strikes inside Russia. [NB that the Financial Times subsequently reported that Trump’s “close foreign policy aides” have told European counterparts that their boss is now inclined to continue military aid for Ukraine, for whatever such a report is worth.] President Zelensky may be looking forward to Germany’s general election on February 23rd as polls suggest that the much more supportive Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democrats will replace Olaf Scholz as Chancellor.
Recent political changes among his own allies have weakened President Putin: the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria was triggered by the inability of either of Assad’s main supporters, Iran or Russia, to intervene militarily. Iran has had a terrible year, as the militant groups it arms and finances have been crushed or weakened, one by one, by Israel: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iran’s own forces in Syria. Russia’s forces are so overstretched by the Ukraine war that Putin could not afford to send planes or soldiers to Syria.
If both sides are losing, both are now putting forward conditions for peace talks which both must know are unrealistic. In his annual press conference on December 19th, Putin claimed he was willing to compromise but insisted the starting point for talks must be the dismantling of Ukraine’s military forces and a full acceptance of Russia’s territorial claims. At a meeting with EU and NATO leaders in Brussels on the same day, Zelenskyy insisted that a peace deal could only be possible with a security guarantee from the whole of NATO, including the US, and eventual NATO membership for Ukraine.
Negotiations always begin with extravagant, unrealistic claims. If real talks do take place next year, the highest likelihood is of a somewhat paradoxical situation: it is that Ukraine’s bargaining position will be stronger than that of Russia, but that President Zelenskyy may have to step aside personally to enable Ukraine to obtain the best outcome that it can.
The reason why Ukraine’s position looks likely to be stronger is that Trump will enter office seeing a Russia that has been weakened by Syria, that no longer has a strong ally in Iran, and which will look an easy target for a self-proclaimed deal-maker like him to push around. If between now and late January Ukraine’s intelligence agencies and military forces can pull off more surprises like their Moscow assassinations, Russia will look all the weaker. Trump will know that he can use authorisation for long-range Ukrainian strikes [or continued weapons supplies] as a bargaining tool against Putin.
Yet allowing Ukraine to join, or even aspire to join, NATO, will be a step too far for Trump, as it goes against his long-stated desire for America to reduce its obligations to come to Europe’s defence. He will not stand in the way of European NATO members offering security guarantees to Ukraine, but whether Germany, France, the UK, Italy or Poland will feel able to afford such guarantees must remain in doubt.
President Zelenskyy has played a heroic role in Ukraine’s fight for survival. He remains highly popular, but because the country has been under martial law since the 2022 invasion the presidential elections due in April 2024 had to be waived. This allows Putin to claim that no peace deal could be signed with Zelenskyy, as his position is not legitimate. Which opens up a chance for a final act of heroism: that to bring a peace deal to a conclusion Zelenskyy could choose to announce his retirement, allowing Ukraine then to show what a resilient democracy it really is by holding presidential elections in which he would not run. No one can doubt that Zelenskyy and his family deserve a holiday, and to retire with honour.
Simple. There has to be an election in Ukraine, which gives Zelenskyy a choice as well as a challenge. Putin is a dictator. He will step down only when forced to.
Why should Zelenskyy do this? Or why not Putin as well?