Even superpowers find it hard to influence their allies
English original of article published in Italian yesterday by La Stampa
The United States and China are divided by many things, but the world’s two leading powers have one problem in common: both President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping have trapped themselves into supporting a close ally that has invaded a neighbour and whose forces are committing every day what many consider to be war crimes. Presidents Biden and Xi have both used threats to try to persuade their ally to behave better. So far, neither has been successful.
Many readers might imagine that America’s support for Israel’s war in Gaza raises rather different issues to China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine — especially as China is rather happier about the consequences of Russia’s war than America is about the consequences of Israel’s. Yet both Israel and Russia are killing civilians in large numbers and making threats that could lead to a widening of their wars, such that in both cases their actions are putting their superpower ally in an uncomfortable position.
There are differences. America was supplying weapons to Israel until May 9th when President Biden ordered those arms shipments to be halted, while China has not been shipping weapons to Russia. Israel, of course, invaded Gaza in retaliation for the deadly and hostage-taking attack on it on October 7th last year by the Hamas military organisation that has governed Gaza since 2007, an attack that formed part of Hamas’s violent campaign to end Israel’s occupation of what is sees as Palestinian territories since 1967 and, indeed, to end Israel’s very existence.
On the other hand, however, Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 with a brutal and unprovoked attack, having previously seized the province of Crimea in 2014, all aimed at reversing Ukraine’s independence which had been agreed and negotiated with Russia itself in 1991. And yet just 18 days before the invasion China had signed a joint declaration with Russia stating that the two countries have a strategic partnership with “no limits” attached to its future potential.
The rights and wrongs of these conflicts are not truly what the United States and China have in common. What they have in common is that each is trying to exercise leverage over its ally in such a way as to serve its own interests and its public reputation: in America’s case, leverage ideally to force a ceasefire but at least to put limits on future civilian deaths in Gaza; in China’s case, leverage to dissuade Russia from threatening the use of nuclear weapons and, ideally, to persuade it to start talks over a peace settlement with Ukraine (though how deeply China desires this is open to doubt).
The question for both President Biden and President Xi is what to do if their threats are ignored by Israel and Russia respectively. What, in other words, can the world’s two most powerful countries do if their bluff is called?
The good news for Joe Biden is that the leverage he holds over Israel is quite strong and direct: the US supplies Israel with nearly $4 billion worth of arms every year. Despite that, the response by Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and some of the extremist parties in his government to Biden’s threat to halt these arms supplies was defiant: Israel, they said, could stand and fight alone if it had to.
That is undoubtedly true, in the short term: the Israeli military already has the weapons and supplies it needs to be able to invade the southern Gaza city of Rafah, which it claims is the last stronghold of Hamas’s military. Yet in the longer term, Israel needs American support, just as it has done ever since the State of Israel was founded in 1948, both for military supplies but also, crucially, diplomatic support in its relations with its Arab neighbours and its confrontation with Iran, the nearby state which itself finances and supplies Hamas and Israel’s other opponent, the Hizbullah militant group in Lebanon.
The face-off between Biden and Netanyahu is therefore a battle of nerves and of willpower on both sides. Prime Minister Netanyahu cannot afford to lose America’s support, but he may choose to bet that it will not be withdrawn for long.
That bet is plausible because for Biden the bad news is that in America’s presidential election year almost anything he does could harm his prospects: if he backs down, Donald Trump will accuse him of being weak; if he withholds support for Israel, both Trump and pro-Israel Democrats will criticise him for doing so. Meanwhile, pro-Palestinian protests on university campuses pose twin dangers: that left-leaning Democratic voters may desert him, and that if disorder spreads (as it did with anti-Vietnam war protests in 1968) then an image of weakness and loss of control could prove disastrous in November’s vote.
That array of bad consequences means, however, that on balance the best course for President Biden would be to use his leverage over Israel to the full: any presidential candidate needs to look strong, and he cannot afford to lose any of his own Democratic Party voters. No candidate is ever disadvantaged by looking strong, but making threats and then withdrawing them would provide irrefutable proof of weakness as well as indecisiveness.
This also fits with a diplomatic imperative: if America is ever to stabilise the situation in the Middle East it needs the support of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar and the Gulf States, and if he backs down on Israel’s invasion of Rafah that support will be lost or greatly diluted. If Gaza is to be rebuilt and policed after the war is over, involvement of those Arab states will be essential.
President Xi’s challenge is more ambiguous than Biden’s. For while China welcomes any disruption to western leadership that may be caused by Russia’s actions, which is why it has provided Russia with both diplomatic and commercial support, it does not want to be associated with threats of the use of nuclear weapons. This is in part because in global diplomacy China is trying to portray itself as a peacemaker and stabiliser, in contrast to a disruptive America, so the more violent its Russian ally becomes the less convincing this stance will be. But it is also because China wants to keep alive the idea that it could re-absorb Taiwan peacefully or at least with only a short conflict, an idea which fits badly with any notion of superpowers using their nuclear arsenals.
The good news for President Xi is that he doesn’t have to face an election and can view Russia’s war with greater indifference than Biden can Israel’s. The bad news, however, is that his leverage over Russia is quite limited. Beyond threats, the only real way in which he can put pressure on Vladimir Putin would be by restricting trade between Russia and China, perhaps especially in the higher technology items that the Russian defence industry needs. But that would make China look rather like America, using trade as a tool of containment. It is quite tough being a superpower.