On this week's Entente Positive between Macron and Starmer

English original of article published in Italian by La Stampa this morning

Britain and France have many things in common, including a history of cutting their kings’ heads off and of pretending to dislike each other even while eagerly visiting each other’s countries as tourists. What they also share today, however, is a set of serious political threats, notably illegal immigration, Russia’s war in Ukraine, the hostility of Donald Trump, and the rise of a far-right populist party to become their main opposition.

Those threats are why President Emmanuel Macron’s glamorous State Visit to London this week represented a good step forward for both countries and for Europe, even if it was only a step, not a leap. No label is likely to be attached to this that has the staying power of the 1904 “Entente Cordiale” between Britain and France, but if a similar label was to be needed an apt one might be “Entente Positive”.

The republican President Macron has a regal style, so riding in horse-drawn carriages with King Charles will have suited him. But there is also no doubt that he understands that even after Brexit the most important and effective defence relationship in Europe is the one between Britain and France.

This wasn’t the only important step forward for Europe this week: Germany introduced a new budget that will implement Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s promises of big rises in public investment and defence spending, which will also help other European economies including Italy; and Giorgia Meloni hosted a productive conference about financial and weapons support for Ukraine. Those steps will be important for the future. But the Franco-British steps are more important for today and for tomorrow.

Germany’s existing defence budget is already Europe’s largest, at $86 billion in 2024 compared with $81.1 billion for the United Kingdom, $64 billion for France (and $35 billion for Italy). France and Britain lack money, but they have three vital ingredients that Germany lacks: nuclear weapons; political will to deploy military force, supported by public opinion; and recent combat experience.

Hence, the most important agreements made and announced by President Macron and Britain’s Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer were military ones: a formal agreement to co-ordinate the use of the two countries’ nuclear forces; and an agreement to set up a joint headquarters, first in Paris but then in London and in Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, to command military operations by the so-called “Coalition of the Willing”, the 30 countries which have promised to provide troops, supplies and tactical support for a 50,000-strong “Reassurance Force” that will be sent to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia.

These agreements promise to be important because of the clear messages they send to Vladimir Putin. First, that if in future he uses the threat of nuclear weapons to intimidate Europe, as he has done in Ukraine, France and Britain will be ready to provide a collective response, without needing permission from the United States to do so. And second, that there is now (or soon will be) a real plan for sending troops to Ukraine to guarantee its security, once a ceasefire has occurred. The fact that America also chose to be represented at this Anglo-French meeting about the Coalition of the Willing suggests that the United States also takes this initiative seriously and wants to be present at the table when decisions are made.

Putin still cares far more about what the Americans do and say than about the Europeans, who he considers to be weak, indecisive and divided. It would be foolish to speculate as to what Donald Trump’s attitude to Ukraine and Russia will be in one week’s time, let alone one month or one year, although he did appear to partially over-rule his own Department of Defence this week by saying he would resume some deliveries of weapons to Ukraine.

Yet what is vital is that when, after this summer’s fighting in Ukraine is over, Putin stops to calculate about whether and how to continue the war into 2026, he will see that a resolute and organised European military response is developing, one that promises to be strong and sustained. What Macron and Starmer achieved this week was to confirm and to build that response.

The key question, however, remains whether that response can and will be sustained beyond at least the term in office of President Macron, which ends in April 2027, and perhaps also the term of Sir Keir Starmer, who must face general elections by July 2029 at the latest, but more likely in 2028. And it is over this question that the two other threats, of illegal immigration and populist far-right opposition, cast a dark shadow.

Italy is unusual in Europe for having had a government elected partly because of fear about illegal immigration but which has remained clearly pro-NATO, anti-Putin and even quite positive about the European Union. While the Meloni precedent offers some cause for optimism, few in France are basing too much hope that a Rassemblement Nationale president, whether Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella, would be as moderate in 2027 as Meloni has been. And while no one will expect Nigel Farage to be positive about the EU if he is elected Britain’s prime minister in 2028 or 2029, there is plenty of room for doubt about his likely stance on Russia and Ukraine.

As a result, British media headlines from the State Visit were dominated by the small, experimental agreement between Starmer and Macron to try to control migration in small boats across the English Channel, not nuclear weapons or joint military commands. The agreement, under which Britain will be able to return illegal cross-Channel migrants to France in exchange for accepting an equal number of legitimate asylum seekers, was considered far less important by the French media than the British, probably because it is not considered so crucial for determining the outcome of France’s 2027 elections.

There is also good reason to be sceptical about whether this experiment can succeed, especially as it faces opposition from some other EU countries, including Italy, who fear Anglo-French rejects will be sent back to them. On its own, it probably cannot succeed: it is too small an experiment to make a big enough difference. But as a step forward towards a larger solution, ideally one negotiated with the whole EU, it may be productive. Sustainable progress needs always to be made step by step, not in giant leaps.