Stay cool about the two-camp world
There is certainly an enduring schism between the West and Russia. But neither the US nor China currently show signs of wanting to extend that divide any further
One of the most remarked upon and, in the West, lamented aspects of Russia’s war on Ukraine has been how, outside Europe and North America, so few countries have openly supported Ukraine and condemned Russia. Japan and Singapore are among the few exceptions. Most have preferred to sit on their hands.
This has led to talk of the de facto recreation of the “non-aligned movement” that India and Yugoslavia led during the Cold War — and indeed of it being led again by India — supposedly with members keeping their distance from the world’s two emerging camps. For in Russia’s camp there is China, which declared itself just 20 days before the invasion as being in a strategic partnership with Russia that “knows no limits”; around China there had anyway been much talk in recent years of “decoupling”, of a “new Cold War” and of increasing tensions with the US.
It has become conventional, therefore, especially since Russia’s invasion, to think of the world as now becoming divided between two clear camps that are deep, systemic rivals, both battling to recruit members of the “non-aligned” to their cause. Conventional, yes: but meaningful? No.
The part about systemic rivalry is undoubtedly true, as we have seen clearly during the past two-and-a-half years of the pandemic. Such rivalry is also central to the pitch made by China and Russia in their February 4th joint statement: what these two say they agree upon is the need to end Western, for which read American, domination of world affairs. There was actually little else of substance in the whole 5,000-word document.
On the American side, one of the few things in Washington on which there is bipartisan agreement is the need to be “tough” with China and to reject past policies of “engagement”. And more and more western allies have also now included in their national defence or security strategic plans language that defines China in some way as a systemic rival, whereas in the past most spoke of it as some sort of a partner, even if a competitive one.
Yet this analysis of a world dividing into camps is nevertheless wrong, at least for now, or at best highly misleading. There is rivalry, of course, and some competition for other countries’ allegiances or at least collaboration. Such superpower competition, with the risks that it brings, is a reality of our times. But the world is too developed and complex for the camp analysis to make any real sense beyond that generality, and the same is true of the notionally “non-aligned”.
To see and feel this, the best place in the world to go to is Asia. Given that, on its broadest definition, Asia accounts for 60% of global population, this can hardly be dismissed as an unrepresentative sample. In the defence and security field, moreover, the best arena in which to feel Asia’s pulse, as it were, is the annual “Shangri-La Dialogue” (SLD) of defence ministers and security personnel from all across the Indo-Pacific that has been convened in Singapore ever since 2002 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the London-based think-tank whose board I have the honour of chairing. This year’s event, the first since 2019, took place on June 10-12.
Given the camp theory, you might therefore expect that the Shangri-La delegates, coming as they did from more than 50 countries, would essentially have been divided into three: pro-Russia/China; pro-West; non-aligned.
Russia, admittedly, was not invited, but China was, and was represented by its Minister of Defence, General Wei Fenghe, along with a substantial entourage; as always, the United States was represented by its Secretary of Defence, Lloyd Austin. These two critical officials had barely spoken to one another over the past two years until they broke the ice with a phone call in April. And thanks to the suspension of Shangri-La for two years as a result of covid, they had not had what has long been an important feature of the weekend, a private, bilateral in-person meeting.
So far, so camp-y. Yet during the weekend’s deliberations, instead of the three-camp division what was notable instead was this: that no one in this vast region, not even China, actually wanted to defend or truly support Russia or what it is doing.
In terms of feeling distaste, discomfort or outright opposition to the invasion of a neighbouring sovereign country by a nuclear-armed superpower, there was really no dispute. Leaving China to one side for the moment, what the SLD showed was that the only real difference between countries on this issue is whether they feel there is any point (or, put another way, national interest) in putting their heads above the parapet about it. On the issue of Russia and its imperialistic actions, it is not so much that countries are non-aligned, as such; it is that they prefer to be non-involved, since they see little benefit in becoming so.
Some, probably, don’t want to annoy China by getting involved, given its partnership with Russia. And if China were trying to force countries to get involved in some way in that partnership, to make choices, we might have got a different impression. But China’s public approach is the opposite of this, and we saw that in the speech to the Shangri-La Dialogue by General Wei Fenghe.
As is normal in such addresses, General Wei accused the United States of all sorts of malfeasances, including, albeit in a rather coded way, blaming it for the war in Ukraine. Yet beyond that accusation, what was noteworthy was how little General Wei chose to say about the war, rather than how much. He avoided all comment on Russia’s intentions or actions. He offered no words of support either for Russia or for President Putin personally. He followed what has over the past month become a consistent official Chinese line by emphasising that the agreement his country signed with Russia on February 4th is a “partnership but not an alliance”. And in response to a question from the audience, he also declared emphatically that China has provided no military support or supplies to Russia.
It was clear that China had come to Singapore wanting to reassure those present about two things: first, that it did not approve of Russia’s invasion as being an appropriate way to behave, and thus that other countries should not consider such conduct to be any kind of a new normal among the superpowers; second, that it did not want to force countries to “choose sides” in any way, at least on this issue.
In part, this just fitted with the official propaganda message such speeches come equipped with, all about how China’s aim is about unity, harmony, eternal peace and universal love. But also it appeared to reflect a genuine effort to keep China’s distance from Russia. Of course, it also reflected a basic belief, rooted in Chinese history, that the true division of the world is far simpler: China, and then the rest. It is the Middle Kingdom, after all. No one else is needed, or even especially welcome, in China’s “camp”.
A few days later, on June 15th, China’s President Xi Jinping and President Putin spoke in a phone call. The Chinese official statement about the call was similarly revealing for how little it chose to say about Ukraine. All it said about China’s support for Russia was this:
The two heads of state also exchanged views on the Ukraine issue. Xi emphasized that China has always independently assessed the situation on the basis of the historical context and the merits of the issue, and actively promoted world peace and the stability of the global economic order.
Not exactly ringing support. The Russian official statement, by contrast, stated that:
The President of China noted the legitimacy of Russia’s actions to protect fundamental national interests in the face of challenges to its security created by external forces.
That phrase about legitimacy is notable for its absence from the Chinese account.
What of the Americans? For his part, Secretary Austin was also careful at SLD to emphasise what the US is not doing: in his speech, he said it is not building an Asian version of NATO, and that it too is not seeking to organise the world into two camps as if in a new cold war. Nor, indeed, he stressed, is it supporting Taiwanese independence: it is merely opposing any attempt to reunify Taiwan and China by force, and continues to abide by the “one China” policy. General Wei in turn emphasised, as is usual. that Taiwan is for China an “internal matter”, and said with passion that China would always fight to prevent anyone — ie, the US — who sought to achieve independence.
Amid the ritual hostilities and exchanges of accusations, notably those on Taiwan, it was the careful positioning by both sides on Russia and on global divisions that stood out. Moreover, Secretary Austin and General Wei then did meet in private, for their first in-person encounter since the Biden administration took office in January 2021.
We should not make too much of that, since as a one-hour meeting through interpreters it was really a 30-minute conversation. Nevertheless, the fact that the two sides are talking is important. Both sides seemed keen to show that they realise, for practical day-to-day reasons but also for reasons to do with the management of nuclear arms, that as the world’s two leading superpowers they have to talk to one another, however hostile they might like to be for public purposes.
Yet what of all the “decoupling”, of technological competition, of arms races for hypersonic and other weapons? And what of India and its apparent non-alignment? For now, the point about decoupling and indeed technological competition is that they both come amid very deep integration between the West and China already, and even greater integration with smaller and less advanced countries. So in so far as there is a pull-back under way, it is from a high level of integration. Except in the most extreme of scenarios this will still leave the West and China quite closely connected with one another. That is the reality for both “sides”. And it is even more of a reality for virtually all the countries around the Indo-Pacific, since for most of them, China is their biggest trading partner and a major investor. That certainly applies to Japan.
This is what we need to keep in mind when we think about the apparent re-emergence of the “non-aligned movement”. Many countries all around the world, in Africa, Latin America and certainly in the Indo-Pacific, have chosen not to directly condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Many, including India, have eagerly purchased discounted Russian oil, while also maintaining an openness to Russia because of a dependence on Russian military technology and supplies. But this silence should not be interpreted as implying support for Russia.
What has been evident at the SLD in Singapore has been that while many countries feel their best interests are served by keeping their heads down and avoiding choosing sides, most if not all nevertheless feel acute discomfort about what Russia is doing. A big reason for that is that in the Indo-Pacific, countries are far more concerned about what China is doing, and about any implications arising from Ukraine for China’s future conduct.
Virtually no countries in the Indo-Pacific accept the idea that the war in Ukraine can or should be defined as a contest between democracies and autocracies, as President Biden has sought to portray it. Too many Indo-Pacific countries, even as western allies, are autocracies for this to be supportable.
But what they can agree on is about the type of behaviour from superpowers that they consider legitimate and what is not. And, quiet though they may be about saying it, almost all agree that Russia’s behaviour is clearly illegitimate, and is therefore threatening to them too. A world in which raw power determines everything is not a world with which most countries can feel comfortable.
Call me, a feathered bird brain! But I really didn’t understand what the Shangri-La Dialogue was about until now. Keep those explanations coming!