The dangers of a widening war
English original of article published in Italian this morning by La Stampa. [Update marked in brackets.]
As President Joe Biden landed in Israel, he could have been forgiven for wondering if he was stepping onto the launch pad for World War Three. With war having suddenly been relaunched in the Middle East by Hamas’s atrocities on October 7th, the risk of the war widening to include Hamas’s main backer, Iran, is real, and Biden knows better than anyone that Iran’s two main friends in the world are Russia and China.
In 2001, after the devastating attacks on America on 9/11, Biden’s predecessor George W. Bush chose to define his country’s principal enemies as the “axis of evil” represented by Iran, Iraq and North Korea, countries united at the time as a category by an American belief that they were all developing weapons of mass destruction. We know that now, two decades later, the world contains what could be described as the “axis of resistance”, for this time four countries -- Russia, China, Iran and North Korea -- are plainly and overtly united as a category by their desire to resist and undermine western leadership and influence wherever and whenever they can.
Yet it is notable that, so far, President Biden has avoided following Bush’s example and defining his country’s, and the West’s, enemies in those terms. It could be tempting to do so, for Russia and China released their “joint statement” publicly declaring their resistance just three weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022; for North Korea made explicit its support for Russia during President Kim Jong-Un’s arms-selling visit to Russia last month; and for Iran has been an overt resister of the West ever since its theocratic revolution in 1979. [Moreover, yesterday President Xi Jinping described his relationship with President Vladimir Putin as a “strong working relationship and deep friendship” when they met in Beijing at China’s Belt and Road Forum.]
There are clear risks of the spread of conflict. The Ukraine war is now more than 600 days old, and we know that Iran and North Korea are both supplying weapons to Russia, while China is offering moral and technological support.
However, the biggest danger of a real, world-transforming conflagration lies further afield, in China’s explicit desire to capture the island of Taiwan and thereby to achieve maritime control over the South China and East China Seas and the western Pacific, a desire which was given tacit support by the February 2022 Russo-Chinese joint statement. If a battle over Taiwan between China, the US, Japanese and Taiwanese forces were to get under way, it is highly likely that North Korea would seek to exploit the situation by attacking, and seeking to conquer, South Korea.
The stakes are high. But that is also why President Biden is right not to define his country’s opponents in the sort of way Bush did, for to do so risks bringing about the very conflict that he, and all of us, would wish to avoid.
The inevitable question surrounding Israel’s war against Hamas, an Iranian-backed group that, like Iran itself, rejects Israel’s very right to exist, is whether or not Iran will feel tempted or obliged to join the war directly – and indeed whether Israel might attack Iran itself.
There are good reasons for thinking that this will not happen. Iran is in a weakened state, following months of internal disorder. It is hard to imagine that its political or military leaders would conclude that a wider war against well-armed opponents such as Israel, let alone the United States, would be in its interest, or likely to end favourably.
Russia is highly overstretched in military terms by its war in Ukraine, and so would not be in a position to help Iran. China’s relationship with Iran is for the time being ambiguous and poorly defined. The two countries collaborate in resisting the West, but China also has cultivated ties with Israel and notably Iran’s Sunni Muslim opponents in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States. Having polished its international reputation by brokering a resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia earlier this year, China would be loath to become directly entangled in any Middle Eastern conflict.
Thinking this through both provides reassurance and defines an agenda for maintaining peace and avoiding truly cataclysmic conflict. The axis of resistance represented by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea is for the time being a network of convenient collaboration, not a military or even clear political alliance. All four countries, but especially China, harbour conflicting interests with the others.
The real danger if these actual and potential conflicts start to widen is one of forcing, or inducing, the members of that network to decide to become a real military alliance. That is why it makes sense to quieten down any talk of wider wars, to seek to keep them separate, and to avoid making public accusations about other countries’ involvements.
In Asia, the best policy is one of deterrence by ensuring that China realises that the costs and risks of an attempted seizure of Taiwan would be extraordinarily high. In Ukraine, the best policy is to ensure that Russia, and any other interested countries, are convinced that Europe and the United States will continue to support the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian society. And in Israel, the most intractable conflict of all, the best policy must be one of containing the conflict as far as possible, which was the purpose of Biden’s visit.
Very insightful analysis.